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I. INTRODUCTION

The Rohingyas are widely considered to be the most persecuted
people in the world. 1 Though they have lived in what is now
southwestern Myanmar for hundreds of years, 2 the Burmese
government denied the Rohingyas citizenship at the country’s
independence from Britain. 3 This statelessness, and the bigotry
underlying it, has led to waves of violence, forced labor, rape, and
murder. 4 In August 2017, the persecution reached a fevered pitch. After
a Rohingya separatist group—the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
(“ARSA”)—killed twelve members of Myanmar’s security forces, the
military retaliated with disproportionate brutality—razing villages,
raping women, and murdering thousands of innocent people. 5 During
this campaign, more than 725,000 of the 1.2 million Burmese
Rohingyas fled across the border into Bangladesh. 6 At least 6,700
Rohingyas, including at least 730 children under the age of five, were
killed in the month after the violence broke out. 7 The exact scale of the
1. See Krishnadev Calamur, The Misunderstood Roots of Burma’s Rohingya Crisis,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/
rohingyas-burma/540513 [https://perma.cc/L6EL-285U] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
2. MOSHE YEGAR, THE MUSLIMS OF BURMA 2 (1972); Myanmar Rohingya: What You
Need to Know About the Crisis, BBC (Jan. 16, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia41566561 [https://perma.cc/7NBW-9535] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
3. AZEEM IBRAHIM, THE ROHINGYAS: INSIDE MYANMAR’S HIDDEN GENOCIDE 35-36
(2016); Adam Simpson, Ian Holliday & Nicholas Farrelly, Myanmar Futures, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY MYANMAR 433-34 (Simpson et al. eds., 2018).
4. Ibrahim supra note 3, at 51.
5. Nahal Toosi, The Genocide the U.S. Didn’t See Coming, POLITICO (Mar./Apr. 2018),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/03/04/obama-rohingya-genocide-myanmarburma-muslim-syu-kii-217214 [https://perma.cc/QF2M-ZP2J] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
6. Human Rights Council, Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International
Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/CRP.2, ¶ 751 (Sept. 17, 2018); Syed
S. Mahmood et al., The Rohingya People of Myanmar: Health, Human Rights, and Identity 389
LANCET 1841, 1844 (2017); see also Rohingya Refugee Crisis, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR THE
COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFF., https://www.unocha.org/rohingya-refugee-crisis
[https://perma.cc/AEK5-QZQD] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
7. MSF: At Least 6,700 Rohingya Killed During Attacks in Myanmar, DOCTORS
WITHOUT BORDERS (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/msf-least6700-rohingya-killed-during-attacks-myanmar [https://perma.cc/6XSF-TMQ2] (last visited
Sept. 28, 2018). Contrarily, the Myanmar government puts the number of dead at 400. Myanmar
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violence remains unknown because Myanmar has limited access to the
affected areas. 8
The international community has condemned the Burmese
military’s brutal campaign against the Rohingyas. U.S. Secretary of
State Rex Tillerson called it an “ethnic cleansing.” 9 Similarly, a top
United Nations official said the action bears “the hallmarks of a
genocide.” 10 But where the international community sees the
Rohingyas as victims of abject persecution, the Burmese political
authorities portray them as dangerous foreigners influenced by Islamist
extremism who are intent on overtaking the homeland.11 These
competing narratives will make resolution of the conflict exceedingly
difficult.
Whatever form reconciliation takes, if it is to be enduring, there
must be justice and accountability for the violence unleashed by the
Burmese military on Rohingya civilians. This Essay explores the
means of justice and accountability available to relevant actors, namely
the National League for Democracy (“NLD”)-led government, the
international community, and Myanmar’s neighbors. It proceeds in five
parts. Part I provides an overview of the political history of Myanmar.
The first Section of this Part presents a general history of the nationstate, focusing on its periods of colonization, military junta control, and
post-2008 transition to democracy. The second Section of this Part
describes the Rohingya people, their history of persecution, and how
their current condition became so precarious.
Drawing on contemporary journalism and non-government
organization (“NGO”) reports, Part II describes the current conflict,
including its acute causes and immediate outlook. Part III provides an
Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis, BBC (Jan. 16, 2018),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561 [https://perma.cc/7NBW-9535] (last visited
Sept. 28, 2018).
8. Toosi, supra note 5.
9. Arshad Mohammed & David Brunnstrom, U.S. calls Myanmar moves against Rohingya
‘ethnic cleansing,’ REUTERS (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmarrohingya-usa/u-s-calls-myanmar-moves-against-rohingya-ethnic-cleansingidUSKBN1DM1N3 [https://perma.cc/Z8A4-DR95] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
10. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human
Rights in Myanmar, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/70, ¶ 65 (Mar. 23, 2018).
11. Calamur, supra note 1. Notably, many critics of the Myanmar government argue that
it is strategically and insincerely expressing this view as a pretext for oppression. See, e.g.,
Violet Cho, Ethnicity and Identity, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY MYANMAR
43, 43, 49-50 (Simpson et al. eds., 2018).
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overview of transitional justice options that may be considered in this
particular case, segmented by the actors who may pursue them. The
first Section of this Part focuses on the two domestic authorities of
Myanmar: Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian-led government and the
military. It analyzes what interest each authority may have in
transitional justice and surveys the available options that each may be
disposed to employ. The second Section considers transitional justice
options that may be undertaken by international actors, such as the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”), the United Nations (“UN”), and
third-party states. Finally, the third Section of this Part considers
whether Myanmar’s neighboring countries may intervene in the crisis.
Part IV concludes by summarizing this Essay’s findings and
calling for justice for the Rohingyas.
A.

Political History of Myanmar

Myanmar is a Southeast Asian nation-state of more than 100
ethnic groups, bordering India, Bangladesh, China, Laos and
Thailand. 12 Through the nineteenth century, various city-states rose
and fell within the modern borders. 13 In 1824, Britain began colonizing
Burma, taking complete control of the country in 1886 and
administering it as a part of its Indian Empire. 14 British colonial rule
ended in Myanmar on January 4, 1948, and democratically elected
civilians governed the country for the subsequent fifteen years. 15 In
12. Cho, supra note 11. Ethnicity and Identity, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY MYANMAR 43, 43 (Simpson et al. eds., 2018). Though the government
recognizes 135 indigenous ethnic groups, seven groups comprise the majority of the population
(i.e. Burman (Bamar) 68%, Shan 9%, Karen 7%, Rakhine 4%, Chinese 3%, Indian 2%, Mon
2%). CIA, Burma: People and Society, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK, at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html [https://perma.cc/
UVC9-7RVK] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
13. CIA, Burma: Introduction, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK, at https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html [https://perma.cc/533C-ED23] (last
visited Sept. 28, 2018).
14. Id. Contemporary ethnic politics in Myanmar are largely a legacy of British colonial
policies, which involved the classification and enumeration of “racial” groups, in many instances
leading to ethnic consciousness. Cho, supra note 11, at 43. In pre-colonial times, it appears that
social categories other than race were of greater importance, such as class distinction and land
possession. Id. Ever since Britain designated race as the primary category of social organization,
“[t]he postcolonial state has invested significant resources into popularizing ‘Burmese’ as a
panethnic category and in countering ethnic minority group-making projects that challenge the
perceived interests of the state.” Id.
15. Lee Jones, Political Economy, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
MYANMAR 181, 181 (Simpson et al. eds., 2018).
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1962, General Ne Win successfully launched a military coup, which
replaced the democratic governance model with a military-backed
Leninist control apparatus. 16 In turn, this regime collapsed during
widespread civil unrest in 1988. 17 Within months of Ne Win’s
downfall, the military—formally known as the Tatmadaw—crushed
student-led protests, and a nineteen-member military junta took
power. 18 In 1990, the Tatmadaw-backed government administered
multiparty legislative elections, which Aung San Suu Kyi’s party—the
NLD—won in a landslide victory. 19 The totalitarian government
rejected this outcome and placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest
from 1989 to 1995, 2000 to 2002, and from May 2003 to November
2010. 20
In late September 2007, the ruling junta once again brutally
suppressed protests led by prodemocracy activists and Buddhist
monks. 21 Nonetheless, in late 2008, the junta administered a
constitutional referendum, the first vote in Burma since 1990. 22 While
the referendum was deemed illegitimate by outside observers, a
majority of voters approved the constitution, 23 which “reserves a
quarter of legislative seats for serving military personnel, mandates
direct military appointments to the executive, and allocates the
Tatmadaw a key role in many aspects of national governance.” 24
In November 2010, the junta administered legislative elections
where the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party
captured over seventy-five percent of the contested seats. 25 Though the
newly elected government was largely composed of former or current
military officers, it initiated reforms in governance and trade that
significantly opened Myanmar to the international community from a
long period of isolation. 26 The reforms culminated in the 2015 election,
16. Ian Holliday & Su Mon Thazin Aung, The Executive, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY MYANMAR 227, 227 (Simpson et al. eds., 2018).
17. CIA, supra note 13.
18. Holliday & Aung, supra note 16.
19. CIA, supra note 13.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Burma: Election Fundamentally Flawed, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 4, 2015
12:00 AM EST), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/04/burma-election-fundamentally-flawed
[https://perma.cc/TKE9-ZXH6] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
24. Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 433-35.
25. CIA, supra note 13.
26. Id.
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which was won, to the shock of many international observers, by the
opposition party: Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD. 27 After more than five
decades of military dictatorship, Burma’s first credibly elected civilian
government was sworn into office on March 30, 2016. 28
B.

The Rohingya People

The Rohingyas are an ethnic Muslim community who practice
a Sufi-inflected variation of Sunni Islam. 29 Before August 2017, the
majority of the estimated 1.1 million Rohingya people resided in
the Rakhine State of Myanmar, on the country’s western coast facing
the Bay of Bengal, where they accounted for nearly a third of the
population. 30 The Rohingyas are a small minority in Myanmar, 31
differing from the dominant Buddhist groups ethnically,
linguistically, and religiously. 32
The ancestors of the Rohingyas were Arab and Persian traders
who arrived in Lower Burma as early as in the ninth century. 33 By the
twelfth century, Rohingya communities were well-established in what
is now Rakhine State, then called Arakan. 34 For centuries, the
Rohingya communities were governed by the Mrauk U or Mrohaung
kingdom, which was independent of both the Burmese kingdoms in the
Irrawaddy delta and central Burma, and the Bengal and Mogul empires
in India. 35 In 1784, the Kingdom of Ava, located in central Burma,
conquered Arakan and ruled the region with an iron fist, subjecting the
Rohingyas to forced conscription and massacres. 36 Accordingly, when
British colonial forces prepared to invade Burma in 1824, the
Rohingyas allied with the British against their oppressor, the Burmese
king. 37
27. Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 433.
28. CIA, supra note 13.
29. Eleanor Albert, The Rohingya Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 9,
2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis [https://perma.cc/V3MZ-HBFB] (last
visited Sept. 28, 2018).
30. Andrew Selth, Burma’s Muslims: Terrorists or Terrorised? 7 (CANBERRA PAPERS ON
STRATEGY & DEF. No. 150, 2003).
31. The total population is estimated to be 55,123,814. CIA, supra note 12.
32. Albert, supra note 29.
33. YEGAR, supra note 2, at 2.
34. Id.
35. KAZI FAHMIDA FARZANA, MEMORIES OF BURMESE ROHINGYA REFUGEES:
CONTESTED IDENTITY AND BELONGING 42 (2017).
36. Id. at 43-44.
37. Id. at 44.
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Myanmar became independent from Britain in 1948, and the new
nation-state’s borders were drawn in accordance with the boundaries
of pre-colonial Myanmar circa 1824. 38 Thus, the newly independent
Myanmar included the home of the Rohingyas—Arakan, renamed
Rakhine State—which for most of human history had been
independent, and sometimes even at war with, the Burmese
kingdoms. 39
The new nation-state of Myanmar inherited a complex assortment
of ethnic groups and religious beliefs, and the Burmese elite debated
whether to create a Buddhist Burmese polity or an inclusive state that
granted citizenship to all within its borders. 40 The debate remained
unsettled until General Ne Win and the Tatmadaw took power in
1962. 41 Given the absence of a homogeneous ethnic identity for the
new nation-state, the Tatmadaw co-opted Buddhism, the majority
religion, designating it as the “essential criterion for being a ‘true
Burmese.’” 42 To this end, during the 1970s and 1980s, the military “coopted organised Buddhism as the state religion.” 43
In 1982, the Ne Win-controlled government passed the
Citizenship Law, which delineated the various ethnicities of Myanmar
into 135 “national races.” 44 The law did not deem the Rohingyas to be
a “national race”; instead, it designated them as “non-nationals” and
“foreign residents,” abolishing their rights. 45 This loss of legal status
led to restrictions on movement, fewer educational opportunities, as
well as insecure land tenure. 46 It ultimately culminated in waves of
violence, forced labor, beatings, and rape. 47 This systematic
persecution has caused intermittent waves of Rohingya migration
38. IBRAHIM, supra note 3, at 35.
39. Id.; MOHAMMED ASHRAF ALAM, A SHORT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ARAKAN
26 (1999).
40. IBRAHIM, supra note 3, at 35-36. While many ethnic groups received automatic
citizenship via the 1947 Constitution, the Rohingya were a notable exception. Id. at 48.
41. Id. at 36-37.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 434.
45. CIA, Burma: Transnational Issues, in The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html [https://perma.cc/533C-ED23]. As of
2014, Myanmar state policy provides two options to Rohingyas instead of citizenship: they
“must demonstrate their family has lived in Burma for at least 60 years to qualify for a lesser
naturalized citizenship and the classification of Bengali or be put in detention camps and face
deportation.” Id.
46. IBRAHIM, supra note 3, at 51.
47. Id. at 51-52.
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within and out of Myanmar. Before the Tatmadaw’s violent campaign
in August 2017, the United Nations estimated that there were 120,000
internally displaced Rohingya and as many as 420,000 Rohingya
refugees in Southeast Asia. 48 Since August 2017, an additional 725,000
Rohingyas have fled to Bangladesh. 49
Despite the persecution to which they have been subjected, the
Rohingyas claim full Burmese citizenship as their natural right. 50 In
contrast, Burmese government officials and a majority of the
population say that the Rohingyas are “Bengali” foreigners who have
never been a part of Myanmar’s history. 51
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT CRISIS
In August 2016, in response to increasing international pressure
regarding the mistreatment of the Rohingyas, the newly elected NLDled government appointed an international advisory commission,
chaired by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, to put forward
recommendations to surmount the political, socio-economic, and
humanitarian challenges that faced Rakhine State.52 By early October
2016, the situation in Rakhine State was relatively stable, despite the
ongoing incarceration of over 100,000 Rohingya in internally displaced
peoples camps. 53 On October 9, 2016, however, the Arakan Rohingya
Salvation Army launched coordinated armed attacks on three border
posts in northern Rakhine State, killing nine Myanmar police officers.54
As a result, the Tatmadaw significantly increased its presence in the
region, which was soon followed by attendant allegations of abuse of

48. Myanmar: Who are the Rohingya?, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/08/rohingya-muslims170831065142812.html [https://perma.cc/K6P3-DREH] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
49. Human Rights Council, supra note 6, ¶¶ 749-51.
50. FARZANA, supra note 35, at 2.
51. Id.; Hannah Beech, Across Myanmar, Denial of Ethnic Cleansing and Loathing of
Rohingya, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/world/asia/
myanmar-rohingya-ethnic-cleansing.html.
52. Myanmar names Kofi Annan to head panel on Rohingya Muslims, AP NEWS (Aug. 24,
2016), https://apnews.com/671961298f7d4f899898d0c063319ffa [https://perma.cc/MWY63NBH].
53. Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 435.
54. Yee Ywal Myint, Rakhine border raids kill nine police officers, MYANMAR TIMES
(Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/22992-rakhine-border-raids-killnine-police-officers.html [https://perma.cc/TUD5-23HD] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
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the Muslim community and an exodus of 70,000 Rohingyas to
Bangladesh. 55
Nearly one year later, Annan’s advisory commission delivered its
final report, which included comprehensive recommendations on
measures to achieve peace in Rakhine State. 56 The NLD government
committed to implement the recommendations “to the fullest extent,
and within the shortest timeframe possible.” 57 One day after the report
was released, ARSA militants attacked thirty police stations and an
army barracks in northern Rakhine State, 58 eliciting a brutal military
response which the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights labelled
“a textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” 59 At least 6,700 Rohingyas,
including at least 730 children under the age of five, were killed in the
month after the violence broke out, according to Doctors Without
Borders. 60 Amnesty International reported that some Myanmar soldiers
raped and abused Rohingya women and girls. 61 Human Rights Watch
reported that at least 288 villages were partially or totally destroyed by
fire. 62 Satellite imagery shows many areas where Rohingya villages
were reduced to rubble, while nearby ethnic Rakhine villages were left
intact. 63 Notably, most of the damage occurred between August 25 and
September 25, 2017—with many villages destroyed after September 5,

55. Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 435.
56. See ADVISORY COMM’N ON RAKHINE STATE, TOWARDS A PEACEFUL, FAIR AND
PROSPEROUS FUTURE FOR THE PEOPLE OF RAKHINE (2017).
57. Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 435.
58. Id.; Human Rights Council, supra note 6, ¶¶ 749-51.
59. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Comm’r for Human Rights, Darker and
More Dangerous: High Commissioner Updates the Human Rights Council on Human Rights
Issues in 40 Countries (Sept. 11, 2017).
60. MSF: At Least 6,700 Rohingya Killed During Attacks in Myanmar, DOCTORS
WITHOUT BORDERS (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/msf-least6700-rohingya-killed-during-attacks-myanmar [https://perma.cc/3LT4-JSKW] (last visited
Sept. 28, 2018). Contrarily, the Myanmar government puts the number of dead at 400. Myanmar
Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis, BBC (Jan. 16, 2018),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561 [https://perma.cc/7WJG-2SKG] (last visited
Sept. 28, 2018).
61. Myanmar: Crimes against humanity terrorize and drive Rohingya out, AMNESTY
INT’L (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/10/myanmar-newevidence-of-systematic-campaign-to-terrorize-and-drive-rohingya-out
[https://perma.cc/V8AU-5JNZ] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
62. Burma: 40 Rohingya Villages Burned Since October, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 17,
2017),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/17/burma-40-rohingya-villages-burned-october
[https://perma.cc/27R7-EMPJ] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
63. Id.
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when Aung San Suu Kyi said security force operations had ended.64
The Tatmadaw also allegedly opened fire on fleeing civilians and
planted land mines near border crossings used by Rohingya to flee to
Bangladesh. 65
Despite the damning NGO reports, the Myanmar authorities have
claimed total innocence. The Tatmadaw, which currently administers
northern Rakhine State, has denied committing any abuses. 66 At the
same time, the Tatmadaw has denied access to independent
investigators and strictly limits access for aid agencies. 67 Likewise,
Aung San Suu Kyi has been reluctant to discuss the matter at all. She
has condemned “all human rights violations” in Rakhine 68 but has
refused to denounce the indiscriminate use of force by troops or even
mention the Rohingyas by name. 69
In November 2017, the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh
reached a deal to repatriate the Rohingya refugees. 70 By January, the
governments finalized a framework, whereby Myanmar agreed to
accept 1,500 Rohingyas each week, with a goal to increase the return
flow over time, so that all 781,000 refugees would return to Myanmar
within two years. 71 Rohingya leaders and human rights advocates have
criticized the agreement as unsafe and premature. 72
III. SURVEY OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE OPTIONS FOR
CRIMES COMMITTED AGAINST THE ROHINGYA
This Part assesses the transitional justice options which may be
undertaken with regard to the violence perpetrated against the
Rohingyas from August 2017 until the present. The first Section of this
Part focuses on the two domestic authorities of Myanmar: Aung San
64. Id.
65. Albert, supra note 29.
66. Wa Lone, Myanmar military denies atrocities against Rohingya, replaces General,
REUTERS
(Nov.
13,
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingyageneral/myanmar-military-denies-atrocities-against-rohingya-replaces-generalidUSKBN1DD18S [https://perma.cc/GZ2J-6YKN].
67. BBC, supra note 60.
68. Saif Khalid, Suu Kyi ‘burying head in sand’ over Rohingya crisis, AL JAZEERA (Sept.
19, 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/suu-kyi-burying-head-sand-rohingyacrisis-170919092338988.html [https://perma.cc/J8B7-7NDG] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
69. AL JAZEERA, supra note 48.
70. BBC, supra note 60.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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Suu Kyi’s civilian-led government and the military. It analyzes what
interest each authority may have in transitional justice and surveys the
available options that could be employed. The second Section
considers transitional justice options that may be undertaken by
international actors, such as the ICC, the United Nations, and thirdparty states. Finally, the third Section of this Part considers whether
Myanmar’s neighboring countries may intervene in the crisis.
A.

Transitional Justice Options that May Be Undertaken by the
NLD-Led Government of Myanmar

The two key political authorities of Myanmar—the Tatmadaw and
the NLD—do not seem keen on implementing transitional justice for
the “ethnic cleansing” of the Rohingyas. 73 The Tatmadaw—the alleged
perpetrators of the crimes—are the strongest opponents of such an
approach. 74 In their view, presumably, the suppression of the
Rohingyas, especially ARSA, has been just, because they are
foreigners and terrorists. 75 Whether they whole-heartedly believe this
or are simply attempting to justify their atrocities remains unclear.
The second power center of the government—Aung San Suu
Kyi’s NLD party—also appears to be averse to transitional justice.76
Not only does Suu Kyi refuse to identify the Rohingyas by name,
shortly after the latest round of violence came to light, her primary
comment was to say that a “huge iceberg of misinformation” about the

73. Hannah Beech, Year After Rohingya Massacres, Top Generals Unrepentant and
Unpunished, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/25/world/
asia/rohingya-myanmar-ethnic-cleansing-anniversary.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2018); Azeem
Ibrahim. Opinion, Democracy’s False Dawn in Myanmar, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/08/07/democracys-falsedawn-in-myanmar/?utm_term=.316090f21ee8 [https://perma.cc/WKG6-SGZL] (last visited
Sept. 28, 2018).
74. See Beech, supra note 73; see also Richard C. Paddock, For Myanmar’s Army, Ethnic
Bloodletting Is Key to Power and Riches, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/27/world/asia/myanmar-military-ethnic-cleansing.html (last
visited Sept. 28, 2018).
75. See Ben Westcott, Myanmar's military clears itself over reported Rohingya atrocities,
CNN (Nov. 14, 2017, 3:27 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/13/asia/myanmar-militaryrohingya/index.html [https://perma.cc/UH9U-HQ3G] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
76. Suu Kyi has been sharply criticized for her inaction. See, e.g., Zachary D. Kaufman,
Give the Nobel Peace Prize Posthumously, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 5, 2017, 7:00 AM),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/05/give-the-nobel-peace-prize-posthumously
[https://perma.cc/3FGU-EH4W] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
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Rohingya crisis was being distributed to benefit “terrorists.” 77 The
rationale underlying the NLD’s silence and implicit support of the
“ethnic cleansing” can only be hypothesized, but four potential reasons
stand out. First, they may fear the Tatmadaw. After all, the military has
successfully toppled numerous civilian-led governments and has even
imprisoned the NLD leadership, including Suu Kyi. 78 Second, the NLD
may actually believe the anti-Rohingya rhetoric. Tensions between the
ethnic Burmese Buddhists and the Rohingya Muslims have existed for
hundreds of years, 79 were further fomented by the British throughout
the colonial era, 80 and have been formalized and given the force of law
by the Tatmadaw. 81 Thus, it is entirely possible that the NLD expressly
supports the military’s actions. Third, the NLD may oppose the
mistreatment of the Rohingyas, 82 but they may be reluctant to change
government policy for fear of electoral backlash. The majority of the
populace, after all, harbors anti-Rohingya sentiments. 83 Finally, even if
the civilian government wanted to hold the military accountable for its
crimes, it has no power to do so given the structure of the constitution.
Accordingly, the most likely scenario would be for the
government of Myanmar to do nothing at all to address the crimes
against the Rohingyas. Sometimes called de facto amnesty, not doing
anything is arguably in the best interest of both of the two key political
authorities of Myanmar. For the military, not acting is the obvious
choice because they are the ones who would likely be held primarily
accountable for the crimes. 84 For the NLD, not acting offers three
benefits: (1) ensuring that its leadership would not be held liable for an
77. Rohingya Crisis: Suu Kyi says ‘fake news helping terrorists,’ BBC (Sept. 6, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41170570 [https://perma.cc/QT9D-82MQ] (last visited
Sept. 28, 2018).
78. CIA, supra note 13.
79. FARZANA, supra note 35, at 43; Beech, supra note 51.
80. Cho, supra note 11.
81. Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 433-35.
82. See id. When the NLD was originally elected in 2016, the party pursued conciliatory
policies with regard to the Rohingya. In particular, they made efforts to promote what they
consider neutral language to refer to the group. Id. In state-owned publications, the NLD-led
government referred to the Rohingya as the “Muslim community in Rakhine State,” whereas the
previous military-backed government referred to the Rohingyas as “Bengalis,” a pejorative and
ethnologically suspect term. Id.
83. See Calamur, supra note 1.
84. See Human Rights Council, supra note 6, ¶ 1521; Beech, supra note 73. Indeed, the
United States, Canada, and the European Union have already placed targeted sanctions on
certain Tatmadaw leaders who are thought to be responsible for the violence. Beech, supra note
73.
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implicit endorsement of the crimes; (2) warding off a coup from an
angry military; and (3) avoiding political backlash from an antiRohingya electorate.
Unlike the Tatmadaw, however, the NLD does have three strong,
countervailing pressures that militate toward affirmatively pursuing
transitional justice. First, there has been significant, continuous
international condemnation of the crimes against the Rohingyas. 85 This
is harmful to the country’s international reputation, which could have
wide-ranging ramifications for its international affairs, including trade,
investment, and development assistance. Second, if the NLD could
successfully put the blame on the Tatmadaw for the killings, it could
reap a greater share of the power in governance. Third, taking action to
address the killings is simply the right thing to do. The NLD itself was
persecuted for decades by the Tatmadaw. Perhaps fresh memories of
their own mistreatment could push the civilian-led government to
pursue some kind of transitional justice. What follows is a discussion
of the various actions that the NLD-led government might take, in order
from most to least likely.
1. Truth and Reconciliation Commission
The most likely transitional justice option that the NLD-led
government could employ would be a truth and reconciliation
commission (“TRC”). While these commissions take many forms, at
their base, truth commissions are “victim-centered, non-judicial
inquiries, established by governments in the aftermath of conflict and
war, to ascertain the facts and evidence of human rights violations.”86
TRCs are an alternative to formal criminal trials as they allow for
amnesty for perpetrators and victim reparations. 87
A TRC would be attractive to the NLD-led government for several
reasons. First, it is potentially politically feasible. A TRC, if it was
constituted without the power to punish, is perhaps the only
accountability measure that the Tatmadaw—who exercise significant
control over the government—may be willing to tolerate. Second, a
85. See, e.g., Myanmar faces international condemnation over Rohingya, AL JAZEERA
(Sept. 4, 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/myanmar-faces-internationalcondemnation-rohingya-170904195521296.html [https://perma.cc/5Y4G-49LS].
86. Penelope Andrews, Justice, Reconciliation, and the Masculinist Way: What Role for
Women in Truth and Reconciliation Commissions?, 60 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 199, 201 (201516).
87. Id.
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TRC is inherently flexible, much more so than formal prosecution. In
determining its mission, the NLD-led government could set a
commission’s focus on any number of subjects for any length of time.
At its most limited, the TRC might investigate the violence that
transpired from August 2017 to the present in Rakhine State.
Alternatively, the TRC could perform a much broader assessment: Are
the Rohingyas entitled to citizenship? How long have their forebears
been living within the modern-day borders of Myanmar? What are all
the injustices that have been perpetrated against them since
independence? Who bears responsibility for these injustices?
From a retributive perspective, there would be drawbacks to the
TRC approach. It would almost certainly ensure that those who were
primarily responsible for the “ethnic cleansing” would escape punitive
measures. It is true that a TRC could condition amnesty on truthful and
forthright testimony, as was done for South Africa’s famous truth
commission. 88 But assuming perpetrators fully cooperated, the only
“punishment” they would be subjected to would be public
embarrassment, which is a far cry from jail time. Furthermore, the NLD
might simply use this mechanism as a ploy to placate international
criticism—giving the TRC a very narrow focus, limited budget, and
implicit instructions not to hold powerful people accountable. Indeed,
this very critique was leveled at the Myanmar government-endorsed
international advisory commission led by Kofi Annan. 89
2. Exile
The NLD-led government could also take action to address the
atrocities against the Rohingyas by exiling the perpetrators. Exile—a
period of absence from one’s home 90—can be voluntary or
involuntary. 91 Either way, it can facilitate a transition to peace. 92
If it becomes clear that a discrete individual or group was
responsible for the latest atrocity against the Rohingyas, then exile
88. ZACHARY D. KAUFMAN, UNITED STATES LAW AND POLICY ON TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE: PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND PRAGMATICS 28 (2016).
89. AL JAZEERA, supra note 48. Azeem Ibrahim, a senior fellow at the Center for Global
Policy, argued Annan’s commission was just a way for Aung San Suu Kyi to “pacify the global
public opinion and try to demonstrate to the international community that she is doing what she
can to resolve the issue.” Id.
90. Exile, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/exile
[https://perma.cc/EX7R-LVKA] (last visited Sept. 29, 2018).
91. KAUFMAN, supra note 88, at 31.
92. Id. at 30.
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could be a particularly good option for this context. It could appeal to
the military, including the perpetrators, because it would allow them to
continue to deny wrongdoing and to avoid jail time or reparations. It
similarly could be palatable for the NLD and the Rohingyas, because it
could be a significant step toward a safer Rakhine State. Nonetheless,
exile does not seem likely in the short term, given the military’s strong
position in Myanmar and the support of the public.
3. Lustration
A third option of the NLD-led government taking action to
address the atrocities against the Rohingyas would be to lustrate the
perpetrators. Lustration has been defined as the non-criminal sanction
of “purging from the public sector those who served the repressive
regime.” 93 This transitional justice approach has typically been
undertaken in settings where a repressive government has collapsed
and been replaced by an entirely new, reform-minded government,
such as post-World War II France and Germany. 94
Modern-day Myanmar does not comport well with the traditional
circumstances in which lustration has been deployed. 95 The Tatmadaw
is not a former, collapsed power, but rather a current, constitutionallymandated part of the government. 96 As such, it is unlikely that it would
abide by any type of lustration program, whether focused on high-level
perpetrators or low-level soldiers. Furthermore, lustration in this
context would pose practical challenges. If it were undertaken without
differentiating levels of culpability, as is often the case and for which
the practice is criticized, 97 then entire divisions of the army might be
lustrated, which would open the country to significant public safety and

93. Id. at 29 (citing Neil Kritz, The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice, in 1 TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE xix, xxiv (1995)).
94. Id.
95. An army general who allegedly oversaw the campaign against the Rohingyas was
removed from his position, Lone, supra note 66, but a single transferred general does not
constitute lustration.”
It is true that an army general who allegedly oversaw the campaign against the Rohingyas
was removed from his position. But a single termination does not constitute lustration. Lone,
supra note 66.
96. Simpson et al., supra note 3, at 433.
97. A basic premise of lustration—the notion of collective rather than individual “guilt”—
means that persons may be punished even without committing immoral acts. See Roman Boed,
An Evaluation of the Legality and Efficacy of Lustration as a Tool of Transnational Justice, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 357, 378 (1999).
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security problems. Ultimately, lustration is a poor fit in this
circumstance from both justice and practicality standpoints.
4. Domestic Prosecution
If the NLD-led government elects to take action to address the
latest round of violence against the Rohingyas, a fourth option would
be to pursue domestic prosecutions. Proponents of this transitional
justice approach argue that it “promotes stability, the rule of law, and
accountability, as well as contributes to deterring future atrocities.”98
The downsides are that it is slow, expensive, and politically risky. 99
Here, if the NLD sought to pursue good-faith prosecutions of high-level
perpetrators, the latter consideration—political risk—would guarantee
the party’s downfall. The Tatmadaw would simply not tolerate
vigorous prosecution of its own leadership.
While domestic prosecution could conceivably take place for the
violence in Rakhine State, it would presumably take one of two forms.
First, the Myanmar government might seek a one-sided accounting of
the conflict, prosecuting 100 only members of ARSA. 101 This is
improbable because Myanmar has labelled this group “terrorists,” 102 so
lethal force is more likely than prosecution. Second, the Myanmar
government could establish a sham military tribunal to try Tatmadaw
perpetrators of violence against the Rohingyas. 103 This approach would
be, by definition, woefully inadequate to achieve real justice. 104 Aside
from these two possibilities, domestic prosecution is nearly
unimaginable as it would directly contradict the Tatmadaw’s narrative
of the conflict. 105
98. KAUFMAN, supra note 88, at 36.
99. Id.
100. This prosecution could be administered either by a civilian court or a military tribunal.
101. See Yee Ywal Myint, supra note 54.
102. AL JAZEERA, supra note 48.
103. Domestic courts have never adjudicated war crimes charges against Burmese
soldiers, and trials for human rights violations are rare. UN Security Council: Refer Burma to
the ICC, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/03/unsecurity-council-refer-burma-icc [https://perma.cc/RUV8-5UGD] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
Furthermore, Burmese soldiers are rarely tried in civilian courts for criminal offenses. Id.
104. Sham military tribunals are not without precedent. Some observers point to the 1968
American massacre of civilians in the village of My Lai, Vietnam as one such example.
KAUFMAN, supra note 88, at 37. There, only a single U.S. soldier was court-martialed to account
for the crimes. Id.
105. The military has preemptively cleared itself of all wrongdoing. Myanmar military
exonerates itself in report on atrocities against Rohingya, GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2017),
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5. Hybrid Tribunal
The NLD-led government could seek to establish a hybrid, mixed,
or internationalized criminal tribunal. Such tribunals are highly
variable, but each tends to “apply a mix of national and international
law (both procedural and substantive) and feature a blend of
international and national elements, such as international and national
judges and personnel.” 106 This option is improbable, as the NLD-led
government has been uncooperative with UN entities since the start of
the latest violence. 107 Indeed, the government has refused to grant visas
to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Myanmar. 108
However, given that the perpetrators are not the NLD-led
government, but the Tatmadaw, it is conceivable that Aung San Suu
Kyi could write a letter to the United Nations requesting a tribunal in
this matter. This is a faint possibility though, because the NLD could
face violence and political backlash for such a move. Additionally, the
international community might be skeptical of commencing this
expensive, arduous process unless there was strong buy-in
domestically, 109 which is not the case here.
6. Indefinite detention
A sixth option of the NLD-led government taking action to
address the atrocities against the Rohingyas would be to indefinitely
detain perpetrators. This transitional justice option involves
“incarceration of an unspecified period of time without trial or even a
formal charge.” 110 This approach would be uniquely ill-suited for this
situation, displeasing both the Tatmadaw and the Rohingyas. As a
practical matter, civilians in the government would be unable to detain
the generals, at least not without significant bloodshed or even civil
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/14/myanmar-military-exonerates-itself-inreport-on-atrocities-against-rohingya [https://perma.cc/B6R5-GTKQ] (last visited Sept. 28,
2018).
106. Sarah Williams, Hybrid International Criminal Tribunals, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES
(Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/
obo-9780199796953-0069.xml [https://perma.cc/2ETE-P63C] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
107. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human
Rights in Myanmar, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/70 (Feb. 26 – Mar. 23 2018).
108. Id.
109. See Sarah Williams, Hybrid Tribunals: A Time for Reflection, 10 INT’L J. OF
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 538, 541-42 (2016).
110. KAUFMAN, supra note 88, at 38.
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war. Indefinite detention would also not serve the aims of placating the
Rohingyas or the international community, because it is usually done
discreetly, with as little publicity as possible. Accordingly, indefinite
detention of Tatmadaw perpetrators111 is extremely unlikely.
7. Lethal force
A seventh and final option that the NLD-led government could
consider would be using lethal force against perpetrators of crimes
against humanity. In the transitional justice context, lethal force is the
“act of state-sponsored, pre-meditated, deliberate, extrajudicial,
targeted killing.” 112 This option, like that of indefinite detention, would
not be seriously considered by the NLD-led government. Presumably,
these political leaders do not have the capacity to orchestrate an
assassination of their own generals. 113
B.

Transitional Justice Options that May Be Undertaken by the
International Community

Even if Myanmar is reluctant to pursue transitional justice for
crimes against the Rohingyas, the international community may pursue
it for them. What follows are transitional justice options that may be
undertaken by the international community, from most to least likely.
1.

International Criminal Court

It is becoming increasingly likely that the perpetrators of crimes
committed against the Rohingyas will be prosecuted by the
International Criminal Court. There is sufficient evidence for the
Prosecutor to indict members of the Tatmadaw for violating Article
7(1)(d) of the Rome Statute, which prohibits “[d]eportation or forcible
transfer of the population” as a crime against humanity. 114 There is also
evidence that the Tatmadaw forces have committed genocide in

111. Notably, the government might hold Rohingyas suspected of violence in indefinite
detention. See Human Rights Council, supra note 6, ¶¶ 1468-70.
112. KAUFMAN, supra note 88, at 32.
113. Notably, the Tatmadaw has already employed lethal force against the Rohingya
community. See Human Rights Council, supra note 6, ¶¶ 1362-70, 1394-95.
114. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90.
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violation in Article 6, by “killing members of the” Rohingya
community “with intent to destroy [them], in whole or in part.” 115
As is often the case with the ICC, there is a jurisdictional obstacle.
The Rome Statute provides jurisdiction in three circumstances: crimes
committed in the territory of a state party, 116 crimes committed by a
national of a state party, 117 and crimes in a jurisdiction that has been
specifically authorized by the UN Security Council. 118
The ICC cannot assert personal jurisdiction over members of the
Tatmadaw because Myanmar is not a party to the Rome Statute. It is
also extremely unlikely that the UN Security Council will refer this
situation to the ICC, because China, supported by Russia, would veto
any referral. 119 China has long been a staunch ally of Myanmar,
providing weapons and training to the Tatmadaw for decades. 120 In
response to the Rohingya crisis, China urged that the international
community “should support the efforts of Myanmar in safeguarding the
stability of its national development.” 121
This leaves territorial jurisdiction. Under a traditional,
conservative reading of the Rome Statute, the ICC could not assert
territorial jurisdiction over the crimes against the Rohingyas because
these crimes occurred within the territory of Myanmar, which is not a
party to the ICC. 122 Geoff Curfman, however, contends that the ICC
could assert territorial jurisdiction over the crime of deportation
because it necessarily takes place in at least two states, and here, one

115. Id. at art. 6.
116. Id. at art. 12(2)(a).
117. Id. at art. 12(2)(b).
118. Id. at art. 13(b).
119. See Michelle Nichols, China, Russia block U.N. council concern about Myanmar
violence, REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingyaun/china-russia-block-u-n-council-concern-about-myanmar-violence-idUSKBN16O2J6
[https://perma.cc/T74H-YDBU] (last visited Oct. 11, 2018). I assume China and Russia would
also block other UN Security Council-based mechanisms of international justice, such as ad hoc
tribunals through its chapter VI or chapter VII powers.
120. David I. Steinberg, The World, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
MYANMAR 291, 296 (Simpson et al. eds., 2018).
121. BBC, supra note 60.
122. See Hans-Peter Kaul, International Criminal Court (ICC), in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 58, http://opil.ouplaw.com/abstract/10.
1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e42?prd=EPIL [https://perma.cc/24AAXFDY] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
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of those states is a state party to the Rome Statute—Bangladesh. 123 As
the argument goes, since one of the elements of the crime occurred
within the territory of a state party, the ICC can assert jurisdiction for
the entire crime. 124 While no ICC case has squarely addressed the issue,
Curfman argues that asserting this form of territorial jurisdiction would
be consistent with the meaning of the Rome Statute and would advance
the Court’s purpose of preventing impunity for grave international
crimes. 125
Fatou Bensouda, the ICC’s chief prosecutor, seems to agree. On
April 9, 2018, the Prosecutor requested a ruling from the ICC’s PreTrial Chamber on whether the Court may exercise jurisdiction over the
alleged deportation Rohingyas from Myanmar into Bangladesh. 126 In
response, the Court invited the Myanmar government to submit
arguments on whether it deemed jurisdiction to be appropriate.127
Though Myanmar declined to formally respond to the Court, 128 the
country issued a five-page statement lambasting the ICC for even
considering the question. 129 Myanmar stated that “the Court has no
jurisdiction on Myanmar whatsoever” and argued that the Prosecutor
was pursuing this case in “[b]ad [f]aith” with a “[l]ack of
[t]ransparency.” 130
On September 6, 2018, the Court endorsed Curfman’s argument
and held that “the Court has jurisdiction over the alleged deportation of
members of the Rohingya people from Myanmar to Bangladesh,
provided that such allegations are established to the required

123. Geoff Curfman, ICC Jurisdiction and the Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar, JUST
SECURITY (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/50793/icc-jurisdiction-rohingya-crisismyanmar [https://perma.cc/5Z63-CMQ5] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Fatou Bensouda, Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article
19(3) of the Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/
CourtRecords/CR2018_02057.pdf [https://perma.cc/E68A-93S4] (last visited Oct. 11, 2018).
127. Case No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, Decision Inviting the Competent Authorities of the
Republic of the Union of Myanmar to Submit Observations pursuant to Rule 103(1) of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under
Article 19(3) of the Statute,” (Int’l Crim. Ct. June 21, 2018).
128. Fatou Bensouda, Notice of the Public Statement Issued by the Government of
Myanmar ¶ 1, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/
CR2018_04048.PDF [https://perma.cc/37U2-9ANU] (last visited Oct. 12, 2018).
129. Press Release, Ministry of the Office of the State Counsellor, REPUBLIC OF MYANMAR
(Aug. 9, 2018), http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/2084 (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
130. Id. at Background, § C.

2018]

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FOR THE ROHINGYA

121

threshold.” 131 The 2-1 decision did not stop there. 132 If the Prosecutor
could meet the required threshold and establish jurisdiction pursuant to
Article 12(2)(a), the Court observed, she may be able to prosecute
related crimes such as persecution and inhumane acts. 133
The decision recognizing jurisdiction and greenlighting the
investigation was lauded by human rights advocates and legal scholars
as a significant step toward justice. 134 Whether an ICC prosecution will
go forward is an open question, but it may be the Rohingyas’ best
chance for justice.
2. UNGA-Created Tribunal
Given the impasse in the UN Security Council due to the
guaranteed vetoes of Russia and China, it may be possible for the UN
General Assembly (“UNGA”) to establish an international criminal
tribunal for Myanmar. Since there could be no veto, UNGA would be
able to establish a tribunal as long as there was popular support in the
chamber. 135 There are questions, however, about the legality of such a
mechanism.
According to Derek Jinks, proponents of an UNGA-established
tribunal would have to rely on Article 22 of the Charter, 136 which reads,
“The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it
deems necessary for the performance of its functions.” 137 Jinks argues
that such a broad reading of Article 22 is suspect in view of the limited

131. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on
Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute” ¶ 73 (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_04203.PDF (last visited Oct. 11, 2018); Marlise Simons,
International Criminal Court Opens Door to a Rohingya Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/world/asia/rohingya-myanmar-international-criminalcourt.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
132. Simons, supra note 131.
133. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on
Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute” ¶¶ 74-78 (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_04203.PDF [https://perma.cc/49JV-2YZ6] (last visited Oct. 11,
2018).
134. Simons, supra note 131.
135. A two-thirds majority is required for “important questions” including matters
concerning the maintenance of international peace and security. U.N. Charter art. 18 ¶ 2.
136. Derek Jinks, Does the U.N. General Assembly have the authority to establish an
International Criminal Tribunal for Syria?, JUST SECURITY (May 22, 2014),
https://www.justsecurity.org/10721/u-n-general-assembly-authority-establish-internationalcriminal-tribunal-syria [https://perma.cc/25QQ-MUFL] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
137. U.N. Charter art. 22.
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powers otherwise accorded UNGA in the Charter. 138 This reading has
been confirmed by an early advisory opinion of the International Court
of Justice and embraced by other international law scholars.139
Accordingly, even if there was popular support for this mechanism, its
establishment might constitute an ultra vires exercise of power.
3. Unilateral Prosecution in Third-Party State via Universal
Jurisdiction
The final transitional justice option that may be undertaken by the
international community would be unilateral prosecution via a thirdparty state asserting universal jurisdiction. Though far-fetched, this
scenario is not wholly without precedent: For example, the former
Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet, was arrested in London under
universal jurisdiction. 140
In March 2018, lawyers in Melbourne, Australia filed a private
prosecution application against Aung San Suu Kyi, who was in
Australia at the time, on charges of crimes against humanity. 141 While
a universal jurisdiction prosecution is possible in Australia, it requires
the consent of the attorney general. 142 This approval was not given,
presumably on the grounds of diplomatic immunity or because the
government considered it bad form to invite a foreign dignitary to
Australia and then proceed to arrest her. 143 In sum, it is unlikely that
perpetrators will be unilaterally prosecuted by a third-party state
asserting universal jurisdiction.
C. Transitional Justice Options that May Be Undertaken by
Myanmar’s Neighboring States
A final possibility to address the Rohingya crisis is the
intervention of Myanmar’s neighboring states. Contemporary scholars
138. Jinks, supra note 136.
139. Id.
140. Kenneth Roth, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2001,
at
153,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2001-09-01/case-universal-jurisdiction
[https://perma.cc/L3F5-CXZT] (last visited Oct. 11, 2018).
141. Ben Doherty, Aung San Suu Kyi: lawyers seek prosecution for crimes against
humanity, GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/17/aungsan-suu-kyi-faces-prosecution-for-crimes-against-humanity?CMP=twt_gu
[https://perma.cc/76C3-URLJ] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
142. Id.
143. Id.
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point to eight instances of humanitarian intervention outside the UN
Charter regime, 144 all of which feature two criteria: “(1) The
intervening state asserted humanitarian purposes (often in conjunction
with other justifications such as self-defense, regional security, or the
consent of an opposition group within the state), and (2) the Security
Council either refused to authorize the intervention under Chapter VII
or was simply not consulted.” 145
The first, and arguably most prominent, example of humanitarian
intervention occurred within the same region of Asia as the present-day
Rohingya conflict. In 1971, as East Pakistan attempted to secede from
the government of Pakistan, the Pakistani military violently suppressed
the insurrection, allegedly massacring hundreds of thousands of the
Bengali population of East Pakistan. 146 An estimated 10 million
refugees poured over the Indian border. 147 Citing, inter alia, selfdefense and humanitarian intervention, India invaded East Pakistan;
West Pakistani forces surrendered thirteen days later, leading to
independence for Bangladesh. 148
In the present conflict, non-UN-sanctioned intervention by a
third-party state, for humanitarian purposes or otherwise, is becoming
increasingly unlikely. Most of Myanmar’s immediate neighbors and
fellow Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) members
have either been silent regarding the Rohingya crisis or outright
supportive of the Myanmar government. Two months after the height
of the “ethnic cleansing,” a statement issued in conjunction with an
ASEAN summit was silent as to the exodus of Rohingya Muslims from
Myanmar’s Rakhine State. 149 China, with its long ties to the Tatmadaw
144. The eight instances are “India’s 1971 intervention in East Pakistan; Vietnam’s 1978
intervention in Cambodia; Tanzania’s 1978-79 intervention in Uganda; France’s 1979
intervention into the Central African Republic; the Economic Community of West African
States’ (ECOWAS) 1990 intervention in Liberia; the United States, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, France, and nine other countries’ 1991 intervention in Northern Iraq; ECOWAS’s
1997-99 interventions in Sierra Leone; and NATO’s 1999 intervention in the Kosovo province
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” Oona A. Hathaway et al., Consent-Based Humanitarian
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499, 510 (2013).
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227, 228 (2015).
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and substantial economic interests in the country, has been a steadfast
supporter of Myanmar, 150 and Thailand has even recently awarded
Myanmar’s army chief a royal decoration. 151
The most likely candidate to intervene in the Rohingya conflict is
Bangladesh—the very state that itself benefited from humanitarian
intervention in 1971. Before the most recent crisis began, Bangladesh
was already hosting a verified population of well over 200,000
Rohingya from Myanmar. 152 As of January 27, 2018, 688,000 new
arrivals had been registered since the latest violence.153 The
extraordinary number of refugees is taxing the resources and patience
of Bangladesh—a geographically small, vastly overcrowded, and
under-resourced nation—and leading to desperate conditions in its
refugee camps. 154
In September 2017, the Bangladeshi foreign minister made his
country’s position on the Rohingya crisis clear: “The international
community is saying it is a genocide. We also say it is a genocide.”155
Similarly, the chair of Bangladesh’s National Commission for Human
Rights said that the Commission might press for an international
tribunal to hold leading figures in Myanmar accountable for
“genocide.” 156 However, the Bangladeshi foreign minister added that
Dhaka was seeking a peaceful solution, not a “war” against
Myanmar. 157
Since the Bangladeshi government’s more heated rhetoric in
September, the bilateral relationship seems to have improved. In
southeast-asia-summit-draft-statement-skips-over-rohingya-crisis-idUSKBN1DD0CP
(last
visited Sept. 28, 2018).
150. Steinberg, supra note 120, at 296.
151. Panarat Thepgumpanat et al., Thailand decorates Myanmar’s army chief amid
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[https://perma.cc/5Y8N-658D] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
152. UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFF., supra
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153. Id.
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matters, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/
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November 2017, Bangladesh and Myanmar agreed to a deal for the
repatriation of Rohingya refugees to their homeland. 158 Following
this initial arrangement, in December, the two countries formed a
Joint Working Group to start the process by January 2018 159—a
process Bangladesh initially demanded be completed within two
years. 160 Notably, the Rohingyas and international human rights
organizations were not consulted during the negotiations, 161 and many
refugees are reluctant to consent to forced, ill-conceived repatriation.162
In sum, the current negotiations between Bangladesh and Myanmar
would seem to foreclose the possibility of humanitarian intervention by
a neighboring state at this time.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the strong condemnation from the international
community immediately after the genocide, the possibility that the
Tatmadaw will be made to account for their crimes is remote. By
making their seat at the table of government in Myanmar
constitutionally mandated in 2008, the Tatmadaw has ensured that they
may act with impunity. Even if the NLD-led government wanted to
seek justice for the Rohingyas—which is doubtable—it could not do so
without triggering the all-too-real possibility of a coup. And the most
vigorous transitional justice mechanism conceivable in the domestic
context is a toothless TRC. Accordingly, the Rohingyas’ salvation must
come from outside the country.
Unfortunately, transitional justice imposed from the outside
seems almost as unlikely as justice coming from within. The UN
Security Council is paralyzed, once again, by the intransigence of
certain Power Five members. The next best option—the ICC
Prosecutor indicting leaders of the Tatmadaw propio motu—is tenuous
due to jurisdictional problems. The final chance for justice for the
Rohingyas—intervention by Bangladesh—is also extremely unlikely.
Instead of moving to safeguard the refugees, Bangladesh seeks to get
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rid of them as soon as possible. Ultimately, at least for the foreseeable
future, it would seem that the Rohingyas will have to face one more
injustice—impunity for their oppressors.
I close by echoing the words of Nobel Peace Prize laureate,
Muhammad Yunus:
“I humbly add my voice to the simple demand of the Rohingya
people: that their rights as our fellow human beings be respected,
that they be granted the right to live peacefully and without fear in
the land of their parents, and without persecution on grounds of
their ethnicity or their form of worship.” 163

163. Muhammad Yunus, Foreword to AZEEM IBRAHIM, THE ROHINGYAS: INSIDE
MYANMAR’S HIDDEN GENOCIDE, at xiii (2016).

